




An individual (the leader) with free access to information decides how much public evidence
to collect. Conditional on this information, another individual with conﬂicting preferences
(the follower) undertakes an action that aﬀects the payoﬀ of both players. In this game
of incomplete but symmetric information, we characterize the rents obtained by the leader
due to his control of the generation of public information. These rents capture the degree
of inﬂuence exerted by a chairman on a committee due to his capacity to keep discussions
alive or call a vote. Similar insights are obtained if the leader decides ﬁrst how much
private information he collects, and then how much veriﬁable information he transmits to
the follower.
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11 Motivation
How can I induce a rational individual whose preferences are diﬀerent from mine to take
actions that are close to my own interests? One possibility builds on the (by now classical)
asymmetric information paradigm, where an agent strategically uses his private knowledge
to obtain some “rents” (possibly at the expense of other agents).1 Another possibility
builds on the related yet slightly diﬀerent idea of “information control,” where an individ-
ual without private information inﬂuences other people’s decision by strategically choosing
the amount of evidence that becomes available to every agent in the economy (including
himself). The goal of this paper is to analyze this second possibility. In other words,
the paper focuses not on the rents that an agent may get from his possession of private
information, as is already well-known, but rather on the rents arising from his mere ability
to control the ﬂow of public information. While the economic literature has explored a
number of related issues (see the review below), to our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper to
speciﬁcally focus on this tool. Note that there is a fundamental diﬀerence between know-
ing that the other party has some information that he does not want to share and knowing
that the other party has decided not to look for information: the act of no-transmission
has some signalling value whereas the act of no-acquisition has no signalling value.
Situations in which one party implicitly or explicitly chooses the amount of information
publicly available can be of very diﬀerent nature. The archetypical example is agenda
setting. Usually, one of the main roles of the chairman in a council (board of directors,
Parliament, faculty recruiting committee) is to decide the moment at which consultations
must stop and a decision has to be reached. Discussions elicit valuable public information.
At the same time, diﬀerences in tastes imply that preferences among members are not
fully congruent. The paper studies how the chairman’s ability to keep the discussion
alive (and let members acquire and share information about the issue at stake) or, on
the contrary, terminate the debate and call a vote allows him to bias the ﬁnal decision
towards his preferred alternative. A similar eﬀect operates in electoral contexts. Often,
the incumbent government has the ability (within some limits) to decide the date of the
1Private information in strategic games has been a cornerstone of incentive theory since the 1970s.
Authors have studied many games (adverse selection, signaling, cheap-talk, etc.) under diﬀerent contexts
(collusion, dynamics, common agency, etc.) and with multiple applications (buyer/seller, regulator/ﬁrm,
government/tax payer etc.). For an introductory exposition, see Laﬀont and Martimort (2002).
2election, reappointment or conﬁdence vote. We show that the capacity to bring forward
or postpone the event depending on whether the last few measures were well received or
harshly criticized by the population will be used to inﬂuence the perception of citizens
and therefore to increase the likelihood of an electoral success. Last, more controversial
but also suggestive is the case of media coverage. Citizens must often rely on the news
provided by media professionals in order to form their view about political events. A
newspaper may inﬂuence the public opinion concerning, for example, US foreign policy in
a given country without falsifying information: depending on the turn of events, it will
strategically decide whether to maintain its reporters in that country and transmit the
news as they occur or bring them back and stop covering the case.
In order to study this strategic game, we propose a model in which one individual
with privileged access to information (the “leader”, he) decides how much evidence to
collect about the state of the economy. Every piece of news is automatically shared with
a second individual (the “follower”, she). Therefore, individuals play a game of imperfect
but symmetric information, and have common beliefs at every point in time. Information
acquisition is sequential. Conditional on the content of the news collected, the leader
decides whether to keep adding evidence or stop the learning process. As a ﬁrst step, we
consider the best scenario for the leader, where he has free access to information and the
follower has no access at all. Once the leader decides to stop the generation of information,
the follower takes an action that aﬀects the payoﬀ of both players. Since the preferences
of the two individuals are not congruent, the leader can and will use his access to the
generation of information to his own advantage. More speciﬁcally, given that information
is costless for the leader, his incentives to acquire or forego evidence depend exclusively
on the likelihood that new evidence will move the belief of the follower further in the
“right direction” (that is, towards the action preferred by him) vs. further in the “wrong
direction”. Stated diﬀerently, in this game the costs and beneﬁts of information are two
sides of the same coin: news which turns out to be good increases the expected payoﬀ
of the leader but news which turns out to be bad decreases it. The paper characterizes
analytically the leader’s optimal stopping rule for the generation of information and his
equilibrium rents, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between his expected utility when he decides
how much information is collected and his expected utility when the follower makes that
3decision (Proposition 1). Naturally, the extent of this public ignorance mechanism as a
tool for inﬂuence depends on several factors. We show that the ability of the leader to bias
the follower’s choice towards his preferred alternative increases as the leader’s preferred
state becomes more likely (Corollary 2) and as the preferences of both players become
more congruent (Corollary 3).
We then consider two extensions of the basic model. In the ﬁrst one, we assume that
the leader bears a positive cost per signal acquired. In the second one, we assume that
the follower can also become informed by paying some ﬁnite cost. We show that, in both
cases, the leader’s inﬂuence on the follower’s choice is reduced but generally does not
vanish. The mechanisms and implications, however, are diﬀerent. When the leader’s cost
of gathering information is increased, he supplies less evidence, which is also detrimental
for the follower (Proposition 2). By contrast, when the follower’s cost is reduced, the leader
supplies more evidence, which is beneﬁcial for the follower. More precisely, the leader is
induced to provide news up to the point where the follower does not have an incentive to
incur the cost of restarting the learning process (Proposition 3). Note that, although in
equilibrium the follower never acquires information by herself, she still beneﬁts from her
capacity to do so.
The reader might object that, in some situations, the leader ﬁrst decides whether to
privately collect information and then, conditional on its content, whether to make it pub-
licly available. In other words, the game may sometimes have two stages: ﬁrst, the leader
collects/foregoes information, and second, the leader transmits/withholds his information
to the follower. For example, newspapers ﬁrst decide whether to send a reporter to investi-
gate an aﬀair, and then whether to publish the results of the investigation. This extension
is considered in section 4. Assuming veriﬁable information, Milgrom and Roberts (1986)
show that the leader will not be able to make a strategic use of his private knowledge.
The idea is simply that the follower will adopt a skeptical, no-news-is-bad-news position:
information transmitted is veriﬁed and information withheld is interpreted as negative for
her interests. Since the leader cannot get rents by hiding information, the game is “as if”
news collected were automatically shared with the follower. Hence, we can apply the same
methodology and obtain the same results as before in the information gathering stage
(Proposition 4). More generally, even in cases where payoﬀs can be increased through
4information withholding, the leader will still be able to obtain rents through information
avoidance.
Before presenting the model, let us review the diﬀerent areas of research related to
our paper. First, the literature on “games of persuasion” is probably the most closely
related to our paper. The contribution by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) has already been
discussed. Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) study whether disclosure of quality tests
should be mandatory. Their setting is similar to ours: a seller (our leader) chooses ﬁrst
whether to test product quality (our information gathering decision) and then whether to
disclose the results to a buyer (our follower) who has diﬀerent preferences. The paper has
the interesting and counterintuitive result that the seller tests and reveals information if
disclosure is not mandatory and he does not test (thus, having nothing to reveal) when
disclosure is mandatory. The reason is that, under the disclosure rule, the seller can
declare ignorance only if he has not tested. Such a claim must then be taken at face
value. While the focus of the analysis is diﬀerent, our paper also generalizes the model
that they study: instead of a one-oﬀ decision whether to collect information, we consider
a stream of opportunities. This way, we can analyze the optimal stopping rule, determine
the maximum rents that can be obtained through public ignorance, and perform some
comparative statics. Second, our analysis also relates to the literature on delegation of
decision rights by an uninformed principal to one or several informed agents (Gilligan
and Krehbiel (1987); Aghion and Tirole (1997); Marino and Matsusaka (2005); Aghion,
Dewatripont and Rey (2004)). Contrary to this literature, we exogenously assume that
one party has control over actions and, instead, we endogenize the decision of the other
party to generate or avoid information. Third, the optimality of ignorance in interpersonal
contexts has also been analyzed in incentive theory. Cr´ emer and Khalil (1992) study the
optimal contract designed by a principal when the agent can spend resources to privately
obtain information before signing it. The trade-oﬀ from the agent’s perspective is the cost
of information vs. the strategic use of news. Instead, in our symmetric information setting,
the decision to forego (free) evidence is based on the likelihood that news will move the
beliefs of the other party towards the “desired” vs. the “undesired” direction. Fourth,
Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), B´ enabou and Tirole (2002) and Brocas and Carrillo (2004)
have shown that an individual with time-inconsistent preferences may remain strategically
5ignorant about a payoﬀ relevant variable. These papers are special cases of the present
analysis, where the conﬂict between self-1 (leader) and self-2 (follower) arises because of
the presence of the hyperbolic discounting parameter. Fifth, the paper can be viewed as
a moral hazard problem where the leader’s action is the amount of information gathering.
In that respect, it is related to the model developed by Sobel (1993), which shows that
the principal may or may not beneﬁt from the agent being informed about the state of
nature. On the one hand, an informed agent can allocate eﬀort more eﬀectively, thus
requiring lower payment to produce. On the other hand, the agent’s uncertainty allows
the principal to design more eﬃcient incentive mechanisms. Last, our paper is also related
to the cheap talk literature (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). In both cases, there is strategic
transmission of free information between individuals whose objectives are misaligned. The
key diﬀerence lies on the reasons why information can be withheld: in cheap talk games
it is assumed that one individual possesses private information whereas in our game it is
assumed that one individual controls the generation of information.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the model. In section
3, we characterize the rents of public ignorance enjoyed by the leader when information
gathering is free and costly and when the follower can and cannot obtain information by
herself. In section 4, we study an extension of the game: the leader ﬁrst chooses the
amount of information privately acquired and then the amount of (veriﬁable) information
transmitted to the follower. In section 5, we conclude and suggest directions for future
research.
2 A model of inﬂuence
We consider the following game. An agent (the leader, he) has free access to information
about the state of the economy. However, every piece of evidence he collects becomes
automatically public. Based on the news obtained by the leader and observed by the entire
economy, another agent (the follower, she) undertakes an action that aﬀects the payoﬀ of
both individuals. Since there is a conﬂict of preferences between the two parties, the leader
can and will use his ability to collect and forego information to his own advantage.
This framework has no asymmetric information. The leader controls the ﬂow of news
but, in case of deciding to obtain some pieces of information, these are revealed to both
6players simultaneously. Technically, agents play a game of incomplete but symmetric
information. Thus, contrary to the standard hidden information literature in which agents
derive rents from their possession of private information, in this paper the leader will
eventually get rents due to his control of the ﬂow of public information. Furthermore,
we assume that parties cannot contract on the information to be revealed during the
game. Although non-contractibility may be inappropriate in some settings, we believe it
is a reasonable assumption in the situations we have in mind. Indeed, contracts between
agenda setters and committee members specifying the amount of consultations required
before calling a vote and between media professionals and citizens specifying the resources
to be spent on obtaining information about US foreign policy would be diﬃcult to enforce.
Utility, actions and signals
We formalize our game of information control as follows. There are two possible states
in the economy, s ∈ {A,B}. Individuals have imperfect but symmetric information about
states. They share a prior belief p ∈ (0,1) that the true state is A, that is, Pr(A) = p and
Pr(B) = 1 − p. Conditional on the information acquired by the leader during the game,
the follower will choose among three possible actions, γ ∈ {a,o,b}. Given action γ, we
denote by v(γ) the utility of the follower and by u(γ) the utility of the leader. The conﬂict
of preferences is modeled as follows:
v(a) =

1/α if s = A
0 if s = B
, v(o) = 1, v(b) =

0 if s = A
1/β if s = B
(1)
u(a) = π, u(o) = π, u(b) = 0 ∀s (2)
where π > π > 0. Note that the inverse of α and β represent how valuable it is for the
follower to take the “correct”, utility maximizing action: a in state A and b in state B,
respectively. Formally, 1/α = v(a|A) − v(b|A) and 1/β = v(b|B) − v(a|B), where v(γ|s)
denotes the follower’s utility under action γ given state s. Denote by µ the posterior belief
that the true state is A conditional on the information transmitted during the game. Given
(1) and assuming that 0 < 1−β < α < 1, then the follower maximizes her expected payoﬀ
by taking action a when µ > α, action o when µ ∈ [1−β,α), and action b when µ < 1−β.
By contrast and given (2), the leader wants the follower to take action a rather than o and
7action o rather b independently of the true state of the economy. This conﬂict of interests





























































Figure 1. Payoﬀs of Leader and Follower.
It is important to notice that there would be no gain in generality if all payoﬀs of leader
and follower depended on the true state. Geometrically, it would just imply a rotation of
the axis in the payoﬀ functions depicted in Figure 1, with the qualitative properties of the
model remaining unchanged.
The structure of information acquisition is the following. At each moment in time,
the leader (and only the leader) decides whether to generate a signal ν ∈ {a0,b0} or not.
There is a ﬁnite but arbitrarily large number of signals T available for collection. Signals
are correlated with the true state. Formally:
Pr[a0 | A] = Pr[b0 | B ] = θ and Pr[a0 | B ] = Pr[b0 | A] = 1 − θ
where θ ∈ (1/2,1). Note that as θ increases, the informational content of each signal ν
also increases. When θ → 1/2, signals are completely uninformative. When θ → 1, one
signal perfectly informs the individual about the true state. As a ﬁrst step, we assume
that generating information is neither costly for the leader nor produces a delay. Since
2We implicitly assume that in case of payoﬀ-indiﬀerence, the follower takes the action preferred by the
leader. Note also that if 0 < α < 1 − β < 1, action o is never optimal for the follower: she takes action a
when µ > α/(α + β) and action b when µ < α/(α + β).
8the number of signals collected can be arbitrarily large, the leader has the option to learn
the true state almost with certainty (as T → +∞, µ → 0 if and only if s = B and
µ → 1 if and only if s = A).3 The follower, on the other hand, has an inﬁnite cost of
generating information. These assumptions are clearly unrealistic: information is rarely
free or prohibitively costly. In Propositions 2 and 3 we study what happens if the leader’s
cost is positive and if the follower’s cost is ﬁnite.
Since it is a game of imperfect but symmetric information, the two parties (i) simul-
taneously update their belief using Bayes rule and (ii) share a common posterior belief
at every stage of the game. Naturally, the decision of the leader whether to keep or stop
accumulating evidence will be contingent on the realization of past signals.4 Suppose that
the information generated is such that a number na of signals a0 and a number nb of signals
b0 have been released. The posterior belief shared by the two individuals is:
Pr(A | na,nb) =
Pr(na,nb | A)Pr(A)
Pr(na,nb | A)Pr(A) + Pr(na,nb | B)Pr(B)
=
θna−nb · p
θna−nb · p + (1 − θ)na−nb · (1 − p)
.
The relevant variable which will be used from now on is n ≡ na − nb ∈ {−T,...,T} ⊂ Z,
that is, the diﬀerence between the number of signals a0 and the number of signals b0. This
diﬀerence is bounded above and below by T and −T, respectively. For a given θ, we deﬁne









Note that, from a modeling viewpoint, it is equivalent to assume that the leader se-
quentially chooses the number of pieces of information (e.g., the time spent by a reporter
to cover an event) or that information exogenously arrives and the leader chooses when
to stop its ﬂow (e.g., ﬁnish the debate and call a vote).
Information acquisition and posterior beliefs
3Note that the rate of convergence to the truth is exponential (see e.g. Chamley (2004), Lemma 2.1.).
4For recent principal-agent models that compare simultaneous vs. sequential acquisition of information,
see Gromb and Martimort (2004) and Li (2004). These papers, however, are still based on asymmetric
information with privately observed signals.
5Immediate properties of µ(n) are: (i) lim
n→−∞
µ(n) = 0, (ii) lim
n→+∞
µ(n) = 1, and (iii) µ(n+1) > µ(n) ∀n.
9The ﬁrst step to characterize the rents obtained due to the leader’s ability to acquire or
forego information is to determine the likelihood of reaching diﬀerent beliefs conditional
on the information currently available. More speciﬁcally, suppose that before releasing
any signals, parties believe that A is the true state with probability µ(0) = p (from now
on, we will for short say that they hold “belief p”). Fix θ, and suppose that the leader
stops acquiring information when the diﬀerence of signals reaches either n = d+(p,θ) ≡
d+ ∈ {1,...,T} ⊂ Z+ or n = d−(p,θ) ≡ d− ∈ {−T,...,−1} ⊂ Z− but never before.
Denote by pH ≡ µ(d+) the posterior belief when the diﬀerence is d+ and by pL ≡ µ(d−)
the posterior belief when the diﬀerence is d−. Given (3) and since d− and d+ are integers,
pL and pH are not completely arbitrary: they can only be reached through a ﬁnite number
of discrete jumps starting from p. Naturally, as the informational content of each signal
decreases (θ smaller), the set of posteriors that can be reached through our discrete process
increases. Also, since the diﬀerence of signals d+ and d− take ﬁnite values, we have
0 < pL < p < pH < 1. Now, suppose for the time being that d+ and d−, and therefore
pH and pL, are exogenously given. We ask the following question: what is likelihood of
hitting each of these posteriors? Naturally, it crucially depends on whether the true state
is A or B. Formally, denote by qs(p;pL,pH) the probability of reaching pH (and not pL)
when the lower and upper boundaries are pL and pH, the initial belief is p ∈ (pL,pH)
and the true state is s. Naturally, 1 − qs(p;pL,pH) is the probability of reaching pL
(and not pH). Last, q(p;pL,pH) is the unconditional probability of reaching pH. By
deﬁnition, we have qs(pL;pL,pH) = 0 and qs(pH;pL,pH) = 1 for all s. Interestingly, given
our simple information acquisition game, it is possible to obtain analytical expressions of
these probabilities. These are gathered in Lemma 1 and they are key for our analysis.6

















Proof. Let Pr(A | n) be the likelihood of state A when the diﬀerence of signals is n. By
deﬁnition, Pr(A | 0) = p, Pr(A | d+) = pH (∈ (p,1)) and Pr(A | d−) = pL (∈ (0,p)).
Denote by λs(n) the probability of reaching a diﬀerence of signals d+ before reaching a
6Technically, the question amounts to determine the evolution of a stochastic process with two absorbing
states. Although the case of one absorbing state is common, we have not found anywhere the analytical
characterization for the case of two absorbing states. We therefore prove it below.
10diﬀerence of signals d− when the current diﬀerence of signals is n and the true state is s.
By deﬁnition, λs(d−) ≡ 0, λs(d+) ≡ 1 and λs(0) ≡ qs(p;pL,pH). By setting T → +∞, we
can ensure that the leader will eventually reach one of the (ﬁnite) diﬀerence of signals d+
or d−. From the deﬁnition of the transmission of information, we have:
λA(n) = θ · λA(n + 1) + (1 − θ) · λA(n − 1) ∀n ∈ {d− + 1,...,d+ − 1} (4)
λB(n) = (1 − θ) · λB(n + 1) + θ · λB(n − 1) ∀n ∈ {d− + 1,...,d+ − 1} (5)
From (4), we have:






λA(n − 1) = 0.
The generic solution to this second-order diﬀerence equation is of the form:
λA(n) = κ1 · rn
1 + κ2 · rn
2,












and r2 = 1
In order to determine the pair (κ1,κ2), we use the fact that λA(d−) = 0 and λA(d+) = 1:














, these equations imply that κ1 =
1
Θd+ − Θd− and κ2 = −
Θd−
Θd+ − Θd− ,
and therefore the general solution is:
λA(n) =
1 − Θn−d−
1 − Θd+−d− ∀n ∈ {d−,...,d+} (6)
Note from (4) and (5) that the case s = B is obtained simply by switching θ and 1 − θ:
λB(n) =
1 − (1/Θ)n−d−
1 − (1/Θ)d+−d− ⇔ λB(n) =
Θd+−n − Θd+−d−
1 − Θd+−d− (7)
11Obviously, p ≡ Pr(A | 0). From the deﬁnitions of Pr(A | n) and using (3), we have:





















































This proof immediately extends to the well-known case of one absorbing state, in
which the leader does not set a lower bound d− where he stops acquiring information (see
e.g., Chamley (2004, proposition 8.2)). The probabilities of reaching the upper bound




1−p. When s = B, with probability
1 − qB(p;∅,pH) =
pH−p
pH(1−p) the leader has not reached pH after T signals with T → +∞
and the posterior is µ → 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 states that the probability of reaching pH before pL is proportional to the
distance between the upper bound and the prior (pH −p) relative to the distance between
the prior and the lower bound (p−pL). Recall from Figure 1 that the follower takes action
a if her belief is µ > α. Therefore, starting from prior p (< α), the likelihood of reaching
a posterior greater than α is higher the smaller the distance α − p. From (1), we know
that α captures the inverse of the follower’s payoﬀ of taking action a correctly. Thus, as
the follower’s payoﬀ of taking action a under state A increases (i.e., as α decreases), she
is relatively more likely to end up with a posterior belief in which she ﬁnds it optimal to
take that action both correctly (when the state is A) and mistakenly (when the state is
B). A similar argument holds for b and β.
By inspection of (3), the reader can notice that not all the posteriors in the open,
convex set (0,1) can be exactly reached. Indeed as n ∈ {−T,...,T} ⊂ Z, the posterior
belief µ(n) exhibits “jumps”. Also, µ(n + 1) − µ(n) is increasing in θ and it is equal to
120 when θ = 1/2. Therefore, when the informational content of each signal is arbitrarily
small (θ → 1/2), the (discrete) change in belief after one signal (µ(n + 1) − µ(n) or
µ(n−1)−µ(n)) is also arbitrarily small. This means that, as θ decreases, there is a ﬁner
partition of the posterior beliefs that can be reached through sampling.7
Note also that qA(·) > q(·) > qB(·) for all pL, pH and p ∈ (pL,pH). By deﬁnition,
the likelihood of obtaining a0 rather than b0 signals is higher when the state is A than
when the state is B. Since a0 signals move the belief upwards (towards A) and b0 signals
move it downwards (towards B), then for any prior p, it is more likely to reach the upper
bound pH before the lower bound pL if the state is A than if the state is B. Also,
limpL→0 qA(p;pL,pH) = 1 and limpH→1 qB(p;pL,pH) = 0: the leader can never believe
almost with certainty that one state is true when in fact it is not. Last, suppose that
there exist θ and ˜ θ such that pH = µ(d+;θ) = µ(˜ d+; ˜ θ) and pL = µ(d−;θ) = µ(˜ d−; ˜ θ). In
words, suppose that the same posteriors can be reached after a diﬀerent number of signals
depending on their informational content.8 In that case, an interesting corollary follows
from the previous analysis.9
Corollary 1. qs(p;pL,pH,θ) = qs(p;pL,pH, ˜ θ).
This result is obtained by direct inspection of the analytical expressions derived in
Lemma 1, and it may at ﬁrst seem surprising. It states that the informational content
of each signal (θ vs. ˜ θ) aﬀects the speed at which one of the posteriors (pL or pH) is
reached but not the relative probabilities of attaining each of them. Roughly speaking,
more accurate information implies greater chances of receiving the “correct” signal (a0 if
s = A and b0 if s = B) but also that an “incorrect” signal moves the posterior farther
away in the opposite direction. These two eﬀects cancel each other out.
7One way to have smooth transitions in beliefs would be to formalize the process in continuous time
and with a continuous arrival of information. The model would have to be modiﬁed accordingly.
8From (3), if ˜ θ > θ, then ˜ d
+ < d
+ and |˜ d
−| < |d
−|: a greater correlation of state and signals implies
fewer number of signals needed to reach either posterior.
9Naturally, if θ and ˜ θ are taken arbitrarily, it is not necessarily true that the same posteriors can be
reached starting from p. Indeed, given a correlation ˆ θ there does not exist always an integer n such that
µ(n; ˆ θ) = pH due to integer problems (for example, in the most extreme case ˆ θ → 1, we have µ(0) = p,
µ(1) → 1 and µ(−1) → 0).
133 Optimal control of information generation
The strategic value of public ignorance
Given the conﬂict of preferences between the two individuals, the leader will use his
control of the ﬂow of information to induce the follower to undertake action a rather than
o or action o rather than b. As information is revealed to both players simultaneously,
inﬂuence can only be achieved through the decision to stop collecting additional news.
In this context, an optimal stopping rule is characterized by at most two probabilities
pL (< p) and pH (> p) (or, equivalently, two diﬀerences of signals d− and d+) such
that the leader stops collecting information if and only if one of these posterior beliefs is
reached. Recall that π, π and 0 represent the payoﬀs of the leader when the follower takes
actions a, o and b respectively whereas 1/α and 1/β are the payoﬀs of the follower under
action a if the state is A and under action b if the state is B. Suppose that p ∈ (1−β,α).
Denote by n+(p,θ) ≡ n+ the minimum integer n such that µ(n) > α and by n−(p,θ) ≡ n−
the minimum integer n such that µ(n) > 1 − β. Denote also the corresponding posterior
beliefs by α+ ≡ µ(n+) and (1−β)+ ≡ µ(n−). Starting from p and given θ, α+ represents
the lowest attainable posterior belief such that the follower is willing to take action a.
Similarly, (1 − β)+ represents the lowest attainable posterior belief such that the follower
is willing to take action o. Assuming 0 < (1 − β)+ < α+ < 1 and using Lemma 1, we
obtain the main result of the paper.
Proposition 1. Suppose that p ∈ [(1 − β),α]. Two cases are possible:10
(i) If π/π 6 (1−β)+/α+ , then pH = α+ and the leader does not set a lower bound. The
expected utility of the leader is U(0,α) = π
p
α+ and the expected utility of the follower is











α+−(1−β)+ and the expected utility of the follower is




10For the sake of completeness, note that if p > α, then learning is never started and the leader gets
utility π. Also, when p < (1 − β) there exists n
+ and n
− as well as α
+ and (1 − β)
− (deﬁned in the same
way as before), and two cases are possible: (i) if π > α
+/(1−β)
+, then pH = α
+, the leader sets no lower
bound and his expected utility is π p/α
+; (ii) if π < α
+/(1 − β)
+, then pH = (1 − β)
+, the leader sets no
lower bound and his expected utility is π p/(1 − β)
+.
14Proof. Since only the leader can learn, if it is optimal for him to stop learning at some
point, then he will not restart it later on. Because the leader maximizes expected utility,
his payoﬀ only depends on the posterior and not on the number of signals it took to reach
it. This, together with the fact that beliefs are uni-dimensional, implies that there are
at most two posteriors (one above and one below the prior) where learning is stopped.
Also, by allowing the stopping rules to coincide with the prior p, we embed the case where
learning is never started. This proves that we can, without loss of generality, consider
a maximum of two stopping posteriors, pH (> p) and pL (6 p). The only restriction is
that, given θ and p, the posteriors pL or pH must be reached after an integer diﬀerence of
signals.
We now determine the optimal stopping rule. According to the leader’s payoﬀ given
by (2), it is obvious that he will never provide information when the diﬀerence of signals
is n > n+ since µ(n) > α+ for all n > n+. Also, extra information cannot hurt him if
n ∈ {n− + 1,...,n+ − 1} or if n 6 n− − 1. The only issue left is whether he will stop
when n = n−, that is when µ = (1 − β)+, or not. If the leader stops at µ = (1 − β)+, he
gets a sure payoﬀ of π. If he continues, then either he reaches a diﬀerence n+ and stops
or he exhausts his T signals and learns almost with certainty that s = B. Stopping at







1 − q((1 − β)+;∅,α+)
i
⇔ π/π > (1 − β)+/α+.






























1 − q(p;(1 − β)+,α+)

Simple algebra gives the ﬁnal outcome. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 shows that the leader derives rents at the expense of the follower due to
his ability to control the generation of public information. Indeed, if the follower could
15decide on the amount of information to be generated during the game, she would force the
leader to exhaust all signals and learn the true state almost with certainty. The expected




β (greater than both V(0,α)
and V(1−β,α)) and U(0,1) = pπ (smaller than both U(0,α) and U(1−β,α)), respectively.
The keys to determine the leader’s optimal stopping rule are the following. First,
once the posterior α+ is reached, the leader has no further incentive to keep collecting
information since, under this belief, the follower takes the action that provides the greatest
payoﬀ to him. Second, the leader will never stop accumulating evidence if µ ∈ ((1 −
β)+,α+): his payoﬀ is π so he can, at the very least, wait until either (1 − β)+ or α+ are
hit. Third, if µ < (1 − β)+ the leader’s payoﬀ of stopping is 0, so there is no downside
in keeping the learning process active. The only remaining question is whether to stop
at µ = (1 − β)+ and obtain a payoﬀ π with certainty or keep providing evidence. In the
latter case, with probability
(1−β)+
α+ the posterior µ = α+ is hit and the leader obtains a
payoﬀ π. With probability
α+−(1−β)+
α+ all signals are exhausted. Both individuals learn
that the true state is B almost with certainty and the leader obtains a payoﬀ of 0.
Note that, as the leader’s payoﬀ under action o gets closer to his payoﬀ under action
a and farther away from his payoﬀ under action b (i.e., as π/π increases), the value of
gambling for a or b decreases relative to the value of stopping at a posterior (1 − β)+
and accepting action o: there is less to win (π − π) and more to lose (π − 0). More
generally, the fact that information is symmetric implies that the costs and beneﬁts of
collecting information are two sides of the same coin: extra evidence may move the belief
of the follower towards or against the direction preferred by the leader. Depending on the
relative likelihood of these two forces and the payoﬀs in each case, the leader will choose
whether to keep generating information or not.
Overall, the ability to control the ﬂow of news and remain publicly ignorant gives the
leader some power, which is used to inﬂuence the actions of the follower. In terms of
our examples, our result suggests that the chairperson, President and media can bias the
decision of the committee, electorate and public simply by strategically restricting the ﬂow
of information. It is essential to notice that the follower realizes that the leader controls
the generation of information to his own advantage. However, contrary to the models
of asymmetric information where no-news (i.e., no transmission of information) signals
16that the leader probably has bad-news, in this model no-news has no signaling value; it
can only be interpreted as the leader being “satisﬁed” with the existing information or
“fearing” what may come next. Also, and by the same token, it is never in the follower’s
best interest to refuse pieces of information, even if she could commit to (the follower is
indiﬀerent between accepting and refusing information only in case (ii) and when α+ = α).
The determinants of inﬂuence
How much inﬂuence can be exerted through public ignorance is an empirical issue,
interesting but beyond the scope of this paper. We would like however to perform some
comparative statics in order to determine under which circumstances choice biases will be
strongest. Given the previous analysis, we have the following result.
Corollary 2. When the leader can control the ﬂow of information, his expected utility is
increasing in p.
An increase in p has two eﬀects. First and trivially, the true state is more likely to
be the leader’s favorite, so his expected utility increases independently of whether there is
inﬂuence or not. Second and more interestingly, the same or fewer a0-signals are necessary
to reach the upper cutoﬀ where the information ﬂow is stopped and the leader’s highest
payoﬀ is obtained. This makes it easier for the leader to inﬂuence the choice of the follower,
whether the true state is A or not.
Note that if π/π < (1 − β)+/α+, then there is no lower bound where sampling is
stopped. In that case, the follower never takes action b contrary to her own best interest
(when s = A). The likelihood that the upper bound α+ is hit when state is B (in which
case the follower takes the leader’s preferred action contrary to her own best interest) is
given by the following simple formula:






This probability is increasing in p due to the second eﬀect mentioned above. From (10),
we can see that inﬂuence can, in fact, be quite substantial. For example, starting from a
prior p = 1/2, if α+ = 2/3 and the state turns out to be s = B, then the likelihood of a
wrong choice from the follower’s perspective is as large as Pr(a | B) = 1/2.
17Costly information gathering by the leader
We have so far focused on the most extreme case where the leader has free access to
information, and showed that he may stop the information gathering process even in that
situation. The analysis can be easily extended to a more realistic setting, where the leader
incurs some cost k per piece of evidence acquired. We have the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose that p ∈ [(1 − β),α] and π/π > (1 − β)+/α+. If the leader bears
a cost k per unit of information collected, then pH(k) = α+ and pL(k) ∈ [(1 − β)+,α+],
with pL(k) > pL(k0) ∀k > k0 and pL(0) = (1 − β)+.11
Proof. Denote by W(n) the value function of the leader given a diﬀerence of signals
n ∈ {n− + 1,...,n+ − 1}. We have:
W(n) = max
n
π, η(n)W(n + 1) + (1 − η(n))W(n − 1) − k
o
where the ﬁrst term in the maximization is the payoﬀ if information is stopped and the
second term is the value of collecting at least one more signal, and η(n) = µ(n)θ + (1 −
µ(n))(1 − θ). We know from Proposition 1 that η(n−)W(n− + 1) + (1 − η(n−))W(n− −
1) < π, so W(n−) = π for all k > 0, and therefore W(n− + 1) > W(n−). We also
know from Proposition 1 that information is stopped at α+ so W(n+) = π > π. If
there exists n ∈ {n− + 1,...,n+ − 1} such that W(n) > W(n − 1) = π, then W(n) =
η(n)W(n + 1) + (1 − η(n))W(n − 1) − k < η(n)W(n + 1) + (1 − η(n))W(n) − k ⇒ k <
η(n)(W(n + 1) − W(n)) ⇒ W(n + 1) > W(n). This means that there exists n∗ such
that W(n) = π for all n ∈ {n−,...,n∗} and W(n) > π for all n ∈ {n∗ +1,...,n+}. Thus,
pL(k) ≡ µ(n∗) (naturally, it may be that n∗ = n+ − 1; this corresponds to W(n) = π
for all n ∈ {n−,...,n+ − 1}, in which case information is never collected). By deﬁnition,
pL(0) = (1 − β)+. Last, since the second term in the maximization is strictly decreasing
in k, the value n∗ and therefore the lower cutoﬀ pL(k) is weakly increasing in k. Q.E.D.
The idea behind Proposition 2 is simple. We know from Proposition 1 that information
is valuable for the leader only as a means to induce the follower to take action a. Therefore,
just like before, sampling is stopped if the upper bound pH = α+ is ever reached. Also,
11Note that pL(k) > p corresponds to the case where sampling is never started.
18when π/π > (1 − β)+/α+, the leader never samples beyond (1 − β)+ due to the risk of
being trapped in a posterior where the follower takes action b. The new eﬀect introduced
by considering a positive cost of sampling is that it may not be worthwhile to acquire
evidence even in situations where beliefs are above (1 − β)+. Indeed, if µ is close to
(1 − β)+, the chances of hitting α+ before (1 − β)+ are small (see Lemma 1). These
beneﬁts are then outweighed by the costs of information acquisition (the large expected
number of costly signals needed to reach α+). Formally, the lower bound where sampling
is stopped will be above (1 − β)+. Naturally, as the cost k of sampling increases, the net
value of experimentation decreases, which translates into an increase in the lower bound
pL. For suﬃciently high costs, the learning process may never be started.
Overall, under a positive cost of information, the leader still keeps and strategically
uses his discretion in the collection of evidence, but his ability to inﬂuence the choice
of the follower is reduced. Interestingly, given that the leader provides less information,
the follower also suﬀers from this positive cost: as already discussed, the lack of private
information in this model automatically implies that she is never better-oﬀ when she
refuses information or, equivalently, when the capacity of the leader to acquire signals is
reduced.
Costly information available to the follower
The basic model considers the most favorable situation for inﬂuence: the leader has free
access to information (or zero cost) and the follower has no access at all (or inﬁnite cost). In
the previous section, we studied the eﬀect of increasing the leader’s cost. We now analyze
what happens when the follower’s cost is reduced. It is indeed plausible to assume that
the follower can also aﬀect the generation of public information. For example, committee
members can spend their political capital in requesting more letters of recommendation
before casting votes. Citizens can independently search for information about events of
national interest, etc. We introduce this possibility in our model by assuming that, at
any moment, the follower can become perfectly informed about the true state if she pays
a cost c (> 0) (since only the follower undertakes an action, it is irrelevant whether the
state is also revealed to the leader or not).12 As in the basic model, the leader has no cost
12This technology corresponds to a cost c paid by the follower for a signal {a
00,b
00} such that Pr[a
00|A] =
19of collecting evidence. In order to avoid a multiplication of cases and problems related to
n being an integer, we suppose that the follower faces a symmetric payoﬀ situation and
that the posterior α can be exactly reached after a ﬁnite number of samplings. Also, both
states are ex-ante equally likely:13
Assumption 1. α = β = α+ and p = 1/2.
Given that information is costly for the follower and that the leader does not have
private access to it, the former will always ﬁnd it optimal to wait until the latter stops
providing pieces of news before deciding whether to pay the cost of becoming perfectly
informed. Suppose that the leader stops the ﬂow of information at a posterior µ ∈ (0,1).
It is possible to characterize the optimal continuation strategy of the follower.
Lemma 2. If c > (1 − α)/α, the follower never learns the true state. If c < (1 − α)/α,
the follower learns the true state if and only if the posterior belief is µ ∈ (αc,1 − αc).





By contrast, her payoﬀ of not acquiring information depends on the posterior belief µ,





µ/α if µ ≥ α
1 if µ ∈ (1 − α,α)
(1 − µ)/α if µ ≤ 1 − α
(12)
From (11) and (12) we get that:




µ < 1 − αc if µ ≥ α
c < (1 − α)/α if µ ∈ (1 − α,α)
µ > αc if µ ≤ 1 − α
Note that µ < 1 − αc and µ > α are compatible if and only if c < (1 − α)/α. Similarly,
µ > αc and µ < 1 − α are also compatible if and only if c < (1 − α)/α. Q.E.D.
Pr[b
00|B] = ˜ θ with ˜ θ = 1 (perfect correlation). Similar results are likely to hold under imperfect correlation
(˜ θ ∈ (1/2,1)).
13Note that β = α ⇒ 1 − β = 1 − α. Also, p = 1/2 and α = α
+ ⇒ 1 − α = (1 − α)
+.
20When the acquisition of information is excessively costly (c > (1−α)/α), the follower
strictly prefers to rely on the news disclosed by the leader, even if she anticipates his strate-
gic use of information. The leader knows that she will not restart learning, and therefore
keeps the same information gathering strategy as in Proposition 1. When information is
not too costly (c < (1 − α)/α), the follower chooses whether to become fully informed or
not depending on her current beliefs. If she is suﬃciently conﬁdent that the true state is
either A or B (i.e., if µ > 1 − αc or µ 6 αc), then the gains of perfect information are
small relative to the cost. By contrast, for intermediate beliefs (i.e., when µ ∈ (αc,1−αc))
news are highly informative, and therefore acquired.
Note that c < (1−α)/α ⇒ αc < 1−α (= 1−β) and 1−αc > α. In words, the leader
knows that if he stops collecting evidence when µ ∈ {1−β,α}, as dictated by Proposition
1(ii), then the follower will for sure restart the learning process and undertake her optimal
action. The anticipation of this possibility induces the leader to modify his information
gathering strategy. Denote by n++ (> n+) the minimum integer n such that µ(n) > 1−αc
and let (1 − αc)+ ≡ µ(n++). Our next result is the following.
Proposition 3. If c < (1 − α)/α, then pH = (1 − αc)+ and the leader does not set













). Also, ∂Uc/∂c > 0 and ∂V c/∂c 6 0 for all c > 0.
Proof. If c < (1 − α)/α, then αc < 1 − α and 1 − αc > α. Hence, the leader will never
provide information when he reaches a posterior µ ≥ 1 − αc (his payoﬀ π is guaranteed)
and he will always provide information if µ 6 αc (he cannot do worse than getting a
payoﬀ of 0). When µ ∈ (αc,1 − αc), the leader has two options. First, to keep providing







(1−αc)+. Second, to stop providing news. In this case, the
follower chooses to learn the true state so the leader’s payoﬀ is π×Pr(A)+0×Pr(B) = πµ.
Since the payoﬀ is always greater with the ﬁrst option, it is optimal for the leader to stop






















3(1 − αc)+ − 1
2α(1 − αc)+ .
It follows that ∂Uc/∂c > 0 and ∂V c/∂c > 0. Q.E.D.
When the follower has the ability to acquire information and it is not excessively costly,
the leader is forced to increase the amount of news released, otherwise he will not be able
to inﬂuence her choices. In particular, o is never going to be selected in equilibrium: for
any belief µ ∈ [1 − α,α], the follower strictly prefers to pay the cost of learning the true
state. Given that either a or b will be chosen, the optimal way for the leader to inﬂuence
the follower’s decision is to remove any lower bound at which information collection is
stopped and push the upper bound up to the point where the follower is willing to take
action a without restarting learning.
Overall, the follower’s ability to collect information by herself reduces the leader’s
discretion in the provision of news, and therefore his capacity to manipulate her choices.
As the follower’s cost c to obtain news decreases, more signals need to be disclosed to avoid
restarting the information gathering process, which implies that the expected welfare of
the follower increases and the expected welfare of the leader decreases.14 However, as long
as this cost is positive, the leader will always derive rents from his capacity to restrict
information and the follower will always suﬀer from it.
Interestingly, the leader makes sure that, in equilibrium, the follower never restarts the
learning process. Yet, her capacity to obtain information is enough to increase her welfare
at the expense of the leader. This conclusion is similar to the contract theory literature
on collusion (Tirole, 1986), renegotiation (Dewatripont, 1988), and information gathering
(Cr´ emer and Khalil, 1992) for example. In these papers, the optimal contract is such that
collusion, renegotiation, and acquisition of information before the contract is signed never
occur in equilibrium. However, just as in our paper, the mere possibility of engaging in
these practices aﬀects the payoﬀs of players.15 Last, it is possible to enrich our model in a
way that the main conclusions hold and the follower sometimes restarts the acquisition of
news. One possibility would be to introduce uncertainty in the follower’s cost of gathering
14Weak monotonicity is only due to sampling being limited to natural numbers.
15By assumption, in Cr´ emer and Khalil (1992) the agent obtains the information at no cost after signing
the contract. The issue, however, is whether to pay a cost in order to get it before signing the contract.
22information. A similar device is employed by Kofman and Lawarr´ ee (1996) to show that
collusion may be an equilibrium outcome in a model ` a la Tirole (1986).
4 Information acquisition and information transmission
In the model presented in section 2, we assumed asymmetric information away in order to
better isolate the rents extracted due to the ability to forego evidence. However, it is often
the case that the leader ﬁrst decides whether to collect information and then, conditional
on its content, whether to transmit it to the follower. A newspaper decides whether
to send a reporter to cover a story but also whether to release or retain the information
discovered. A manager usually has an easier access to information internal to the ﬁrm than
an outside auditor. He then uses to his own advantage both his capacity to collect/forego
and his capacity to transmit/withhold evidence. A counsel for the defense keeps or stops
searching for evidence as a function of his current ﬁndings, but he also chooses to present
to the jury favorable evidence and to conceal unfavorable one. Note that, for practical or
legal reasons, in the situations described above, parties cannot contract on the amount of
information to be acquired and revealed.
To capture the situations described above, we propose a two-stage variant of the model,
where the leader ﬁrst decides the amount of information privately acquired, and then the
amount of information transmitted. Intuitively, the incentives to acquire information
are now diﬀerent: the act of “no news transmitted” may (and, in equilibrium, will) be
interpreted by the follower as “bad news possessed”. We will make the key simplifying
assumption that the information acquired by the leader is veriﬁable. Suppose that the
leader stops acquiring pieces of information when his posterior belief is µ ∈ [0,1]. He then
provides a report r(µ) (⊂ [0,1]) to the follower. In formal terms, veriﬁability implies that
the posterior belief must be contained in the report, that is, µ ∈ r(µ). As it turns out, the
properties of the sequential equilibrium of the information transmission stage of this game
have already been studied in the literature on games of persuasion (Milgrom and Roberts,
1986). We can combine their result with our Proposition 1 to determine the equilibrium
of our two-stage game.
Proposition 4. In the two-stage game with private acquisition of veriﬁable information,
23the optimal stopping rule of the leader is the same as in Proposition 1. Moreover, in every
sequential equilibrium, the action taken by the follower and the payoﬀs of both players
are also the same as in Proposition 1.
Proof. Suppose that the leader stops at a posterior belief µ and reports R ⊂ [0,1] (with
µ ∈ R). Denote by ρ the posterior belief inferred by the follower given R.
Step 1. Suppose that ρ = ˜ µ iﬀ @ ˆ µ < ˜ µ s.t. ˆ µ ∈ R. Milgrom and Roberts (1986,
proposition 1) shows that, assuming this inference, then @µ0 < µ s.t. µ0 ∈ R: the lower
bound of the leader’s report will always be his true belief.
Step 2. Using this result, Milgrom and Roberts (1986, proposition 2) then shows that,
at every sequential equilibrium, the follower infers ρ = ˜ µ iﬀ @ ˆ µ < ˜ µ s.t. ˆ µ ∈ R.
Step 3. Since for any belief µ of the leader, the report R will be such that the follower
infers ρ = µ, the optimal acquisition of information rule is the same as in Proposition 1,
and so are the payoﬀs of both individuals. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 states that, with private but veriﬁable information, the leader will not
be able to aﬀect the follower’s choice by strategically manipulating the transmission of his
private information. Naturally, he will be able to exert the same inﬂuence as before with
the control of information generation. The idea is simple. Since the follower knows the
incentives of the leader to overstate the likelihood of state A, she will adopt a “skeptical
posture”: always assume the worst which, in our case, corresponds to the lower bound of
the report set. As a result, the leader will neither include in the report a posterior below
his own belief nor be able to instil on the follower a posterior above it.16 Since private
information cannot be withheld in equilibrium, the optimal information collection strategy
of the leader is the same as in section 3. An alternative lecture of this result is that public
generation of news is suﬃcient but not necessary for inﬂuence through ignorance to occur.
The reader might ﬁnd unrealistic that all the information possessed by the leader
is inferred by the follower. Rents from information withholding can be restored if we
relax the most restrictive assumptions of our game. Matthews and Postlewaite (1985)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) discuss for example the case of unveriﬁable information.
16Note that the equilibrium is not unique: given a belief µ, we can only state that the leader’s equilibrium
strategy will contain µ as the lower bound of the report set. By contrast, the response of the follower is
unique (act as if the report was µ), and so are the payoﬀs of both players.
24Other alternatives would be to assume that the follower anticipates only partially the
incentives of the leader to misreport information (i.e., to introduce bounded rationality) or
to assume that players have imperfect knowledge of each other’s preferences (i.e., to include
a second dimension of private information). Adding these ingredients would undoubtedly
make the model more realistic.
5 Conclusion
The starting point of the paper was to argue that an individual with privileged access to
information can inﬂuence the decision of his peers in two fundamentally diﬀerent ways.
First, with his decision to hide or transmit his private information. Second, with his
decision to acquire or forego additional (private or public) information. While the ﬁrst
mechanism builds on the classical asymmetric information paradigm and has been exten-
sively studied in the literature, to the best of our knowledge the second mechanism has
received almost no attention. The goal of our paper was to provide a ﬁrst careful look to
the rents that can be extracted through public ignorance.
Many other issues related to this idea deserve scrutiny. For example, in our framework,
the utility of players is common knowledge. It would be interesting to study a model with
several sequential actions where the preferences of the follower are private information.
Our intuition is that the leader may ﬁnd it optimal to stop accumulating evidence, observe
the ﬁrst action of the follower, deduce (perfectly or imperfectly) her preferences from her
behavior and decide whether to restart the acquisition of information. As emphasized at
diﬀerent places in the paper, we may also learn new insights by combining information ac-
quisition and information transmission, as in Matthews and Postlewaite (1985): how does
the leader’s ability to manipulate the transmission of information modify his willingness
to acquire news in a ﬁrst place? Another extension of interest would be to assume that the
follower observes the information obtained by the leader with some positive probability,
and that the latter can spend resources to decrease this probability. What would be the
interplay between the leader’s incentives to acquire knowledge and his incentives to hide
the information? One may also wonder what will happen in this game if individuals start
with diﬀerent priors about the state of the world and therefore have diﬀerent interpreta-
tions of the evidence generated (as, for example, in Van den Steen, 2004). Last, it would
25be interesting to determine under which circumstances the leader loses part or all the rents
of public ignorance. Again at an intuitive level, rents may shrink or even vanish if several
individuals with conﬂicting goals (two newspapers, a defense counsel and a prosecutor)
compete to provide/withhold information. Also, if the relationship between the individu-
als is repeated, the follower may credibly threaten to take the action least preferred by the
leader unless full information is revealed. Our hope is that these questions will stimulate
further research on the subject.
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